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Introduction
Analyses of economic and financial develop-
ments often rely on propositions about the
rationality of market participants. Particularly in
financial markets, where information is widely
and readily disseminated, it is commonly
presumed that economic agents have “rational
expectations” about the future course of events.
This assumption can have powerful implications
for the efficacy of certain government policies.
Questioning the rationality of foreign-
exchange market participants is particularly
tempting, in light of the widely acknowledged
poor performance of many economists’ models
of exchange-rate determination. Models that
view exchange rates as equal to the expected
present discounted value of future “fundamen-
tals” (for instance, monetary policy, fiscal policy,
and trade flows) and assume that participants
have rational expectations about future funda-
mentals have done poorly in predicting
exchange-rate movements. Although this latter
finding has stimulated a wide body of research,
the validity of the rational expectations hypoth-
esis remains unresolved.
An anomaly in international finance related
to the rational expectations hypothesis is the
forward discount puzzle, in which the forward
foreign exchange rate predicts the wrong direc-
tion of movement for the future spot rate. Most
verifications of this puzzle presume rational
expectations and, thus, are worth reconsider-
ing if the hypothesis is to be rejected. Lewis
(1995) summarizes work surrounding this
puzzle. Baillie and Bollerslev (1997) examine
earlier findings, suggesting that with more
recent data the puzzle no longer appears.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993) illustrate
how crucial the rational expectations
assumption might be in analyzing the impact 
of government policy. They conclude that cen-
tral banks’ foreign-exchange intervention had a
significant impact on risk premia in currency
markets during 1982–88. However, their find-
ing hinges on survey data on exchange-rate
expectations. When rational expectations are
imposed, intervention is seen to be ineffective.
In this article, I extend previous research on
the rationality of survey measures of expecta-
tions for foreign exchange rates. Section I
reviews the literature, highlighting several inter-
pretations of rationality. Section II provides
some motivation for my choice of econometric
tests. Section III presents summary information
about the data and then the results of the main
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results strongly reject the “unbiasedness”
hypothesis with one-week, one-month, and
three-month data. Ito (1993) also rejected the
hypothesis for the 1985–87 period, at least for
longer-run horizons. Cavaglia, Verschoor, and
Wolff (1993) confirm this finding with EMS
exchange rates, as well as with exchange rates
against the U.S. dollar for  1986–90.4 Beng and
Siong (1993) also reject unbiasedness for the
Singapore currency against the dollar for
1984–91 for all forecast horizons. However, Liu
and Maddala (1992), using cointegration tech-
niques, cannot reject the rational expectations
hypothesis for the 1984–89 period. 
Orthogonality
The second most familiar interpretation of the
rational expectations hypothesis is that expecta-
tions incorporate all available information. Tak-
agi (1991) summarizes examinations of this
“orthogonality” hypothesis. Generally,
Dominguez (1986), Froot and Frankel (1989),
Ito (1993), MacDonald and Torrance (1989),
Cavaglia, Verschoor, and Wolff (1993), and
Beng and Siong (1993) find that the survey




Findings of a twist (short-run expectations
show bandwagon effects, but long-run expecta-
tions are stabilizing) motivate an examination
of the connection between the short run and
long run. Froot and Ito (1989) propose a defini-
tests of interest. Finally, I summarize what has
been gained from the exercise and what might
be suggested for future research. 
I. Related Literature
Econometric analyses of survey data have
typically focused on the rationality of partici-
pants’ expectations. The most familiar inter-
pretation of rationality is expressed in terms of
expectations representing unbiased forecasts of
the actual future outcome. However, several
related questions might be of interest. For
example, one might question whether expecta-
tions incorporate—or react to—news of funda-
mentals. In addition, rationality might imply a
specific relationship between short-run and
long-run expectations. These questions suggest
the value of studying alternative mechanisms
through which expectations are formed, and
they are closely related to the issue of whether
a risk premium exists in foreign exchange mar-
kets.1
In his survey of surveys, Takagi (1991) notes
three characteristics of survey data on expecta-
tions of future exchange rates. First, the disper-
sion of expectations tends to increase with the
forecast horizon, an outcome that may be
related to group effects.2 Interestingly, Ito (1993)
finds that Japanese exporters had expectations
of greater yen depreciation, while Japanese
importers had exactly the opposite expecta-
tions.3 Second, expected changes in exchange
rates tend to underpredict the actual extent of
exchange-rate movements, implying that much
of actual exchange-rate movements are unex-
pected. The third characteristic is referred to as
“twist”—that is, longer-run expectations tend to
reverse the direction of short-run expectations.
For example, an appreciation would tend to be
followed by an expectation of further deprecia-
tion, but an expectation of further appreciation




This paper will focus on the most familiar inter-
pretation of rationality—that survey measures
are unbiased forecasts of actual future out-
comes. Dominguez (1986) tested this hypothesis
by regressing actual depreciation on expected
depreciation for the 1983–85 period using data
from both Money Market Services and the
Japanese Center for International Finance. Her
n 1 The use of survey data to extract risk premia or to study the mech-
anisms through which expectations might be formed will not be discussed
here, except to note that several of the articles surveyed discuss the issues.
Among those that use survey data to extract risk premia are Frankel and
Froot (1987a) and Dutt and Ghosh (1995). Among studies of mechanisms,
see Frankel and Froot (1987a, 1987b). 
n 2 Cavaglia, Verschoor, and Wolff (1993) find that the mean expected
depreciation tends to fall with the forecast horizon, as does the variance of
forecast errors. This is contrary to the findings of other researchers.
n 3 Ito (1993) is the only study to use panel data and to examine het-
erogeneity among survey respondents. He also finds individual as well as
industry effects. As Ito points out, if all relevant information about exchange
rates is public, the finding of heterogeneity implies a rejection of rationality.
n 4 These authors remind us that the “peso problem”—wherein
market participants allow for a small probability of a large change in the
future exchange rate—can explain an ex post finding of bias even if
expectations are formed rationally. 
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between short-run and long-run expectations
might be related to the types of forecasting
techniques employed. In particular, it is reason-
able to speculate that short-run forecasts are
derived from “chartists,” or technical analysis,
while longer-run forecasts are based on models
of fundamentals. This possibility has been
largely unexplored (as of Takagi [1991]). Hung
(1997) relates the activities of chartists to the
conduct of U.S. central bank foreign-exchange
intervention policy. Bhattacharya and Weller
(1997) explore possible implications of asym-
metric information for intervention.  
II. Test 
Specifications
In this article I test the unbiasedness hypothesis
using Money Market Services data for 1989–97
on the deutsche mark/dollar (DM/$) exchange
rate. My results will update Liu and Maddala’s
(1992) analysis of 1984–89. In order to prop-
erly compare our results with those previously
published, I will review the progression of
econometric techniques that have been utilized
in this area.




where St+k is the actual future exchange rate
and Se
t,t+k is the expectation at time t of the
future exchange rate at t+k.5 The unbiasedness
hypothesis stipulates that a=0 and b=1. In
addition, we might look at the orthogonality
condition, regressing (St+k – Se
t,t+k) on infor-
mation available at t and testing for coefficients
equal to zero. Or, we might test to see if forecast
errors were serially uncorrelated. If the latter is
not the case, it would imply that the forecast
could be improved by considering past errors.
However, as a wide body of research has dis-
cussed, if St+k and Se
t,t+k are nonstationary and
follow unit-root processes, conventional t tests
will be incorrect. To avoid this, some have sug-
gested estimating equation (2)
(2) St+k–S t = a+b(Se
t,t+k–S t)+et+k,
and testing a=0 and b=1. Although the left
side of equation (2) is stationary, if both com-
ponents have unit roots it is not clear that the
same can be said for the right side. By analogy
tion of consistency. However, any definition of
consistency requires the mechanism through
which expectations are formed to be specified.
Their evidence is mixed with results that differ
with horizon. Ito (1993) confirms the existence
of twist and also rejects consistency. However,
in their study of Singapore’s currency, Beng
and Siong (1993) find no evidence of twist.
Expectations 
Formation
Takagi (1991) summarizes studies of the mech-
anisms of expectations formation by Frankel
and Froot (1987a,b), the Bank of Japan (1989),
and Froot and Frankel (1990).  Extrapolative
expectations means that the expected currency
movement is related to the most recent move-
ment. Generally, examination of this mechanism
leads to the conclusion that bandwagon effects
are present in the short run, but effects of the
opposite sign are present for longer horizons.
The effects are usually stabilizing. With adap-
tive expectations, the expected movement rep-
resents an average of the actual current and the
expected current. The results of Frankel and
Froot (1987a, b) are inconclusive regarding the
validity of this mechanism. The length of the
horizon seems to matter, and findings are not
inconsistent with an unanticipated appreciation
leading to an expected depreciation in the long
run. Regressive expectations are said to exist
when the actual exchange rate is expected to
move toward an equilibrium rate. The results of
Frankel and Froot (1987a, b), the Bank of Japan
(1989), and Froot and Frankel (1990) point to
the conclusion that expectations can be destabi-
lizing in the short run, moving away from equi-
librium, whereas the opposite effect occurs for
longer horizons. Beng and Siong (1993) exam-
ine the same three mechanisms and find stabi-
lizing extrapolative expectations but no stabiliz-
ing adaptive mechanism operative; in terms of
the regressive mechanism, both short-run and
long-run expectations move backward toward
an equilibrium value. Ito (1994) finds that,
despite the presence of mean reversion in the
actual exchange-rate series for the yen, such




Froot and Frankel (1990) and Allen and Taylor
(1990) have suggested that the differences
n 5 For the time being, I ignore the serial correlation issues that arise
when k is not equal to one when the sampling frequency is one.
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to the arguments of Liu and Maddala, the right
side can be written as (Se
t,t+k –Se
t –1,t+k –1) 
+( Se
t–1,t+k –1–St ); the second term is stationary
only if a=0 and b=1. Another possibility is to
estimate equation (3),





t –1,t+k–1 –S t) from the 
right side.
I will follow the more direct approach sug-
gested by Liu and Maddala. First, note that if
St+k follows a random walk, so should its ratio-
nal forecast; thus, the two time series should be
cointegrated with a factor of 1 and random
residuals. However, standard cointegration tests
allow estimation of the cointegrating factor
and do not require random-error terms. Rather
than estimate equation (1) as the cointegrating
equation, we first test whether St+k and Se
t,t+k
are unit-root processes, and then test for the
stationarity of mt = (St+k–Se
t,t+k ). The second
step restricts a=0 and b =1, so that it can be
referred to as a restricted cointegration test. As
Liu and Maddala state, if mt is stationary, then
St+k and Se
t,t+k  are cointegrated with a factor of
1 because the cointegrating factor is unique
when it exists.
Testing for Unit Roots
The most widely used unit-root tests for a vari-
able yt rely on equations of the form
p
(4) Dyt = d0+  d t+(a –1)yt–1+^aj Dyt– j+et
j =1
and focus on the coefficient associated with yt–1.
A key consideration is how many lags of the
left-side variable to include. Liu and Maddala
follow a procedure suggested by Schwert
(1989). Ng and Perron (1995) describe two
popular procedures, the Akaike information 
criterion and a criterion suggested by Schwartz,
both of which minimize an objective function
of the form 
(5) Ik=log s2
k +kC T /T ,
where s2 is the maximum-likelihood estimate
of the variance, T is the number of observa-
tions, and k is the number of right-side variables.
For the Akaike information criterion, CT =2, and




































Economic Review 2000 Q1a. Lag lengths by column (left to right) are 8, 4, 8, and 3.
b. Lag lengths by column (left to right) are 0, 1, 0, and 0.
c. Lag lengths by column (left to right) are 1, 0, 0, and 0.
NOTE: DF tests use the t-statistic forb from estimation of the equation:
p
(A1)    Dlog yt+1= a+b log yt +gt +^Ui Dlog yt+1–i +et+1,
i =1
tt and tm include and exclude the linear time trend, respectively.
ZA (usually written as Za) statistics are based on the same equation without
lagged changes, though a choice of lag length is needed to estimate an ana-
logue to the covariance matrix. 
The t and m superscripts have the same significance as above.
DF-GLSm and DF-GLSt, respectively, exclude and include a linear trend from
the first-stage regression (as described in the text) and then estimate equation
(A1) without constant, trend, or lagged changes.
LR and BIC indicate the criteria by which lag length was chosen. 
Critical values for t t, ZA t, and ZAm can be found in MacKinnon (1994). 
For DF-GLSm, the 5 percent critical value for a large number of observations
is –2.89. The DF-GLSm statistic has the same distribution astm.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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Perron (1995) also propose starting with a max-
imum value for k and decreasing the number
of lags until the coefficients on the last n lagged
terms are significant, but not if the total number
of lags were decreased again by 1. When n=1,
this procedure finds the lag length k where the
t-statistic on the k +1th lag is not significant but
the t-statistic on the k th lag is significant. In his
survey of the area, Stock (1994) suggests using
the sequential procedure of Ng and Perron
(1995), denoted LR, as well as the Schwartz crite-
rion with the lag lengths constrained to between
three and eight.
The unit-root tests also differ in their treat-
ment of the “nuisance parameters” in equation
(4), the constant and linear trend t. Stock
(1994) evaluates the various tests and suggests
using the DF-GLS test subsequently presented
in detail in Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock
(1996). The DF-GLS requires two steps. First, let
zt=(1,t). Then, assuming that the process for y
is AR(1) with a coefficient a =1+c/T, estimate
b by regressing [y1, y2(1–aL),…yT (1–aL)] onto
[z1, z2 (1–aL),…..zT (1–aL)] and then creating
yd = y –zt8b. Second, estimate equation (4)
without the constant or the trend. The t-statistic
on lagged y is the DF-GLSt statistic with critical
values given in Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock
(1996). The DF-GLSm statistic omits t from the
first stage. Its distribution is that of the more
familiar Dickey–Fuller t m statistic. The constant
c is set equal to –7.0 for the no-trend case and
–13.5 with trend. For comparison with Liu and
Maddala, we present results of the Dickey–Fuller
tests and the Phillips–Perron tests.6 All are pre-
sented with both constant but no trend (m) or
constant and trend (t). 
III. Data and Results
We analyze data provided by Money Market
Services for the deutsche mark/dollar exchange
rate from January 6, 1989, through October 24,
1997.7 The survey data represent the medians
of the forecasts of the respondents for the one-
week and one-month horizons (figures 1 and
2). The frequency of the data is weekly, and
one month should be interpreted as corre-
sponding to four weeks. 
Table 1 indicates the unit-root test statistics
for log (future DM/$) and the survey median of
expectations of the future DM/$. Despite the
wide variation in chosen lag lengths, in no case
do we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root
for either weekly or monthly forecast horizons
at the familiar 5 percent level of confidence.
At the top of table 3 we also include Q-
statistics similar to those presented by Liu and
Maddala and which allow us to assess the
extent of serial correlation present in residuals
for four, eight, and 12 lags. We do this for the
first differences of the individual series. Our
inability to reject the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation supports a conclusion of rationality.  
Unit-Root Tests on Logarithms of Future and 
Expected Future Deutsche Mark/Dollar Exchange Rates
TABLE 1
Statistics Weekly Monthly
Actual Survey Actual Survey
tt(LR)a –2.429 –2.117 –2.430 –2.288
tt(BIC)b –1.887 –1.935 –1.858 –1.719
tm(LR)a –2.615 –2.357 –2.612 –2.470
tm(BIC)b –2.205 –2.252 –2.125 –2.011
ZAt(LR)a –9.799 –11.065 –9.694 –9.389
ZAt(BIC)b –8.173 –12.547 –7.995 –7.557
ZAm(LR)a –10.115 –11.459 –9.948 –9.952
ZAm(BIC)b –8.683 –12.686 –8.441 –8.340
DF-GLSt(LR)a –2.653 –2.331 –2.577 –2.430
DF-GLSt(BIC)c –2.122 –2.545 –2.064 –2.036
DF-GLSm(LR)a –2.652 –2.336 –2.570 –2.427
DF-GLSm(BIC)b –2.251 –2.323 –2.104 –2.090
n 6 The Phillips–Perron tests omit the lagged terms but still require a
choice of lag length. 
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Table 2 lists the restricted cointegration test
statistics for weekly and monthly horizons.
Because the test statistics are less than the critical
values for the 5 percent level in all instances,
we reject the null hypothesis of no cointegra-
tion. Table 3 also presents Q-statistics for the
forecast errors. However, since the frequency
of the data is weekly, a weekly series on the
one-month forecast error will display serial
correlation even if the forecasts are rational.
In fact, this series will have a third-order moving-
average error process (MA[3]).8 In this case,
we analyze the residual from estimating this
series as an MA(3) process. We find no evi-




Using more recent data and newer techniques,
we confirm the findings of Liu and Maddala in
favor of the rationality of Money Market Ser-
vices survey forecasts. Although this would
seem to support the rational expectations
hypothesis, several notes of caution are in
order. First, we would not necessarily confirm
other implications of the rational expectations
hypothesis, such as the orthogonality of forecast
errors with respect to publicly available infor-
mation. Second, it is not clear how median
expectations are linked to the marginal prices
(exchange rates) observed in the marketplace.
This is one reason why economists have tended
to downplay survey measures. 
Nonetheless, analyses of these data bear
directly on the issue of whether a risk premium
exists in foreign-exchange markets and whether
policy changes are anticipated correctly. Conse-
quently, these findings are relevant to analysis
of U.S. central bank intervention or other macro-
economic policies in the 1990s. Future research
might fruitfully explore these possibilities.  
Q-Statistics for Test of 
Serial Correlation
a. Analysis of residual from MA(3) estimation of the weekly series of one-
month-ahead forecasts.
NOTE: All Q(k) statistics are distributed as x 2 (k). 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
TABLE 3
Series Q(4) Q(8) Q(12)
(1–L)* (weekly, actual) 2.1 7.3 11.2
(1–L)* (weekly, survey) 11.5 12.9 17.2
(1–L)* (monthly, actual) 2.3 7.4 11.2







Restricted Cointegration Test on Logarithms of Future 
and Expected Future Deutsche Mark/Dollar Exchange
















n 8 We could follow Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) and impose the
three moving-average parameters which would be implied by the assump-
tion that the weekly process follows a random walk. 
a. Lag lengths by column (left to right) are 9 and 6.
b. Lag lengths by column (left to right) are 0 and 6.
c. Lag lengths by column (left to right) are 9 and 10.
NOTE: LR and BIC indicate the criteria by which lag length was chosen. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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